



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

verted into immediate sensuousness, but in such a manner that there can be seen in it the movement and history of God, the life which is God himself.

HEGEL ON THE STATE.

TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT," BY E. D. MEAD.

B. *The Foreign Relations of the State.*

547. By war, the independence of the State is put in jeopardy. But the mutual acknowledgment of free individual nations is effected (by war) and through treaties of peace, which are to be lasting, this general acknowledgment, as well as the special rights of peoples in their mutual relations, is established. The foreign relations of the State are governed partly by these positive tracts, containing, however, in so far, only laws which lack true actuality; partly by the so-called rights of nations, whose general principle is the presupposed acknowledgment of the States, and which, therefore, sets such bounds to their otherwise unrestrained dealings with each other that the possibility of peace remains; it also distinguishes individuals as private persons from the state; and it rests in general on established usage.

C. *The World-History.*

548. The particular national spirit, since it is real, and its freedom exists as nature [unconscious usage], has, through this natural side, the moment of geographical and climatic influences; it is in time, and has, according to the content, essentially a special principle, and must pass through a development of its consciousness, and of its reality, determined by that principle; it has a history of its own. As circumscribed spirit, its independence is a subordinate one; it passes over into the general world-history [*i. e.*, it loses itself in the process of the World-History], whose events represent the dialectic of the special national spirits, the judgment of the world [*i. e.*, the verdict of History on the validity of what is contributed by each nation].

549. This movement is the course of the emancipation of the spiritual substance, the act through which the absolute design and purpose of the world is fulfilled in the world, through which spirit, first existing only in itself [potentially], comes to consciousness and self-consciousness, and so to manifestation and reality of its in-and-for-itself-existing essence, and becomes also externally universal, world-spirit. Since this development is in time and existence, and is thus history, its particular moments and stadia are the national spirits; each, as particular and natural in a qualitative determinateness [a qualitative determinateness is a portion of a function allotted to a single agency], is fitted only to the working out of one stage, the fulfilment of one function in the whole work.

The presupposition in history of an in-and-for-itself-existing purpose, and of determinations developing themselves out of it according to the notion, is called an *a priori* consideration of history, and the charge of *a priori* writing of history has been made against philosophy. Concerning this charge, and concerning the writing of history in general, we will make some, more definite, observations. That a final purpose in-and-for-itself lies at the basis of history, and has been and will be actually realized in it—the plan of providence—that, in general, reason is in history, must be determined for itself philosophically, and therefore as in-and-for-itself necessary. To presuppose arbitrary conceptions or thoughts, and to try to find and to represent events and deeds in conformity with these, deserve only censure. Of such an *a priori* method of procedure, however, those are to-day guilty who pretend to wish to be pure historians and at the same time take occasion expressly to declare themselves opposed to philosophizing—partly in general, partly in history. Philosophy is a troublesome neighbor to them, because it is opposed to what is arbitrary and capricious. Such *a priori* writing of history has sometimes prevailed where we should least expect it—viz., in philological quarters, and in Germany more than in France and England, where historical writing has risen to a stronger and riper character. To write fictions—about an original condition and an original people which possessed the true knowledge of God and all sciences; about nations of priests; or more specially about a Roman *epos*, which has been the origin of all narratives which pass for historical concerning the earliest history of Rome, etc.—this has taken the place of ex-

planations of history on psychological grounds and connections, and it seems to be regarded in a large circle as the requisite of a learned and clever historian who draws from the sources, to hatch out such hollow representations, and to combine them daringly with remote external circumstances derived from an erudite sweeping, in defiance of the most authentic history.

If we set aside this subjective treatment of history, the strictly opposed demand that history shall not be considered according to an objective purpose is equivalent on the whole to that which seems more fully justified—viz., that the historian proceed with impartiality. It is very common to make this demand upon the history of philosophy as something in which no inclination to any conception or opinion ought to show itself—as a judge is to have a special interest for neither of two opposing parties. At the same time, it is held of a judge that he would administer his office pettily and poorly if he had not an interest—indeed, exclusive interest—for justice, if he had not this for his aim, and his sole aim, and if he abstained from exercising judgment. This requisite in the judge we can call partiality for justice, and we are very well able to distinguish between this and a subjective partiality. But in the impartiality demanded of the historian this distinction is, in the juiceless, self-conceited talk, obliterated, and both kinds of interest are thrown away when it is demanded that the historian shall bring to his work no definite purpose and view according to which he shall separate, regulate, and estimate affairs, but shall narrate them precisely in the accidental fashion in which he finds them in their unrelated and thoughtless particularity. That a history must have a subject—for instance, Rome, its fate, or the decline of the greatness of the Roman empire—is conceded. Little deliberation is necessary to comprehend that this is the presupposed purpose which lies at the ground of the events themselves, as well as of the judgments concerning them which have for the history an importance—*i. e.*, nearer or remoter relation to the subject. A history without such purpose and without such judgment were only a weak series of representations—not even a child's fairy-tale; for even the children demand in stories an interest—*i. e.*, at least, the hinted aim, and the relation of events and treatment to it. In the existence of a people, the substantial purpose is to be a State, and to maintain itself as such; a people without political

organization (a nation as such) has properly no history, as the peoples that now constitute the great States existed before their political organization, and others still exist as uncivilized nations. That which happens to a people and proceeds within it has its essential significance in relation to the State; mere particulars concerning individuals are the farthest removed from the real subject of history. If the universal spirit of a time imprints itself on the character of the distinguished individualities of the time, and their peculiarities are also the remoter and dimmer mediums, in which it plays in weakened hues, and if even the particulars of a small event, or a word, often express not a subjective particularity, but a time, a people, a civilization, with striking perspicuity and power (the selection of such points being only the work of an able historian); on the other hand, the mass of other particulars is superfluous, and, by the faithful gathering of these, the subjects worthy of history are oppressed and darkened—the essential characteristic of the spirit and its time is contained in the great events. A correct sense has led to the banishment of such picturing of particulars and selection of special features to the field of romance (for instance, the works of Walter Scott, and the like); it is in good taste to unite pictures of unessential particular life with an unessential matter, such as the romance takes from private events and subjective passions. But to weave individual trifles of events and persons into the representation of universal interests, in the name and for the sake of what is called truth, is not only contrary to judgment and taste, but contrary to the conception of objective truth in the sense of which only the substantial is true, not the emptiness of external existences and accidents. It is perfectly indifferent whether such insignificant matters are formally authenticated or, as in romance, characteristically invented to meet the necessities of characterization, and names and circumstances ascribed to this or that. The interest of Biography, which may be referred to in this connection, seems to stand directly opposed to a universal purpose; it, however, has indeed the historical world as the background with which the individual is complicated; the subjectively original, the humorous, etc., reflect themselves upon that world, and enhance their interest by it. But the simple agreeable or temperamental has another ground and interest than history.

The demand for impartiality in the history of philosophy, as also in the history of religion, partly general, partly church history, usually contains the yet more express exclusion of the presupposition of an objective purpose. As previously the State was named as that to which the judgment had to refer events in political history, so here the truth must be the subject to which the particular acts and affairs of spirit were to be referred. The contrary presupposition, however, is much rather made, that these histories shall have only subjective aims—*i. e.*, only opinions and conceptions, not the in-and-for-itself-existing object, the truth—for their content, and this, indeed, on the simple ground that there is no truth. According to this acceptation, the interest for the truth appears likewise only as partiality in the ordinary sense—viz., for opinions and conceptions which, equally empty, are counted altogether indifferent. Historical truth itself has, consequently, only the sense of accuracy, an exact account of the external, and with no other judgment than concerning this accuracy itself—to which simply qualitative and quantitative judgments are admissible no judgments of necessity and the notion. In fact, however, if, in political history, Rome or the German Empire, etc., is a real and true object, and the purpose to which the phenomena are to be related, and according to which they are to be judged, so in universal history is the universal spirit, its consciousness, and its essence, still more a real and true object, content and aim, which in and for itself all other phenomena serve as even their existence through relation to it—*i. e.*, the judgment through which they are subsumed under it and it inherits them. That in the course of spirit (and it is spirit, which not only moves upon the face of history as it did upon the face of the waters, but it weaves within it, and is alone the moving power) freedom—that is, the development determined by its notion is the determining, and its notion is its aim—*i. e.*, the truth since spirit is consciousness—or, in other words, that reason is in history—will be partially, at least, a plausible belief; partially, however, it is knowledge of philosophy.

550. This emancipation of spirit in which it comes to itself and realizes its truth, and the work of this emancipation, constitute the highest and absolute right. The self-consciousness of a particular people bears in its existence the stage of the development of the universal spirit at the time, and the objective reality into

which it puts its will. Against this absolute will the will of other particular national spirits has no right; that people rules the world. But the absolute will steps beyond its temporary abiding-place as a particular stage, and gives it over to the tribunal for judgment.

551. Since such process of realization appears as action, and therefore as a work of individuals, these are, in reference to the substantial content of their work, tools, and their subjectivity, which is that peculiar to them, is the empty form of activity. That, therefore, which they have attained for themselves through the individual participation in the substantial work prepared and determined independently of them, is a formal universality of subjective conception—fame, which is their reward.

552. The national spirit contains natural necessity, and has external existence; and in this its in-itself infinite moral substance is for itself particular and limited, and its subjective side is exposed to accident, and becomes unconscious custom, and consciousness of its content as temporally present and related to an external nature and world. But it is spirit thinking in the form of morality which annuls in it the finiteness which it has as national spirit in its state and the State's temporary interests, in the system of laws and customs, and lifts it to knowledge of itself in its essentiality. This is a knowledge which still itself has the imminent narrowness of the national spirit. The thinking spirit of the world-history, however, since it, at the same time, tears off those limitations of the particular national spirits and its own worldliness, comprehends its concrete universality and raises itself to the knowledge of absolute spirit, as the eternally real truth in which the knowing reason is free for itself, and necessity, nature, and history only serve for its manifestation, and as vessels of its honor.

Of the formal process involved in the elevation of spirit to God I have spoken in the introduction to my logic. In regard to the starting-point of this elevation, Kant's conception is in general most correct in so far as he considers faith in God as proceeding from the practical reason. For the starting-point contains implicitly the content or matter which constitutes the content of the notion of God. The true concrete matter is, however, neither Being (as in the cosmological proof), nor mere teleological activity

(as in the physico-theological proof), but Spirit whose true nature is the working Reason—*i. e.*, the self-determining and realizing Notion itself—Freedom. In the Kantian representation of the elevation of the subjective Spirit to God, which takes place in this conception of the true nature of man as freedom, this conception is reduced to a postulate, to an ideal [that is, to be striven after, but never reached]. This is the immediate restoration to truth and validity [of the human reason] out of the previously [in the “Critique of Pure Reason”] discussed impotence, the [immersion in the] antithesis of finiteness; and the annulling of this impotence is itself that elevation to truth.

Of the mediation which the elevation to God constitutes, it has previously been pointed out that the moment of negation through which the essential content of the starting-point is purged of its finiteness, and through this becomes free, is especially to be considered. This moment, which in the logical form is abstract, has now attained its most concrete significance. The finite, which is here the point of departure, is the real moral self-consciousness. The negation through which it raises its spirit to its truth is the purification of its knowledge from subjective opinion and the emancipation of its will from the selfishness of appetite, which are really accomplished in the moral world. True religion and true religiousness proceed from morality, and are morality in its thinking activity—*i. e.*, becoming conscious of the free universality of its concrete essence. Only from morality, and proceeding from morality, is the idea of God as free spirit known; it is, therefore, vain to seek for true religion and religiousness outside of the moral spirit.

But this proceeding takes at the same time this meaning—as occurs everywhere in the speculative—viz., that that which in the first place is posited as consequent and derived is much rather the absolute *prius* of that through which it appears to be mediated, and is also known here in spirit as the truth of spirit.

This, therefore, is the place to enter more closely upon the relation of the state and religion, and in that connection to examine categories which are here commonly current. The immediate consequence of what has been said is that morality is the state in its substantial internal being; the State is the development and realization of morality; the substantiality of morality itself, how-

ever, and of the State, is religion. The State rests, according to this relation, on the moral sentiment, and this in turn upon the religious sentiment. Since religion is the consciousness of the absolute truth, that which is to avail as right and justice, as duty and law—*i. e.*, as true in the world of free-will—can avail only so far as it partakes of that truth, is subsumed by it, and follows as a consequence from it. But, in order that the true moral be the consequence of religion, it is requisite that religion have the true content—*i. e.*, that the conscious idea of God in it be the true one. Morality is the divine spirit, as immanent in self-consciousness in the real existence of this as a people and the individuals composing it; this self-consciousness, proceeding from an empirical reality into itself, and bringing its truth into consciousness, has in its faith and in its conscience only that which it has in the certainty of itself in its spiritual reality. The two are inseparable. There cannot be two kinds of conscience—one religious and another one that is moral, different from the former in worth and content. According to form, however, *i. e.*, for thought and knowledge—and religion and morality belong to intelligence, and are a thinking and knowing—the religious content, as the pure in-and-for-itself-existing, therefore the highest truth, gives its sanction to the morality which obtains empirical reality. Thus, religion is for self-consciousness the basis of morality and of the state. It has been the monstrous error of our time to try to regard these inseparable things as separable from one another; indeed, as mutually indifferent. The relation of religion to the state has been viewed as though the state already existed on its own account through some power or other, and the religion, as the subjective of the individuals, as something desirable merely to strengthen the state, had been added, as it were, or were indifferent even, and the morality of the state—*i. e.*, rational law and constitution—stood firmly for itself on its own ground. In connection with the declared inseparability of the two sides, it is interesting to consider the separation as it appears from the side of religion. It concerns, in the first place, the form—*i. e.*, the relation—of self-consciousness to the content of the truth. Since this is the substance in its reality, as Spirit dwelling in self-consciousness, self-consciousness has thus immediate assurance of itself in this connection, and is free in it. The state of non-freedom can exist, however, according to the

form, although the in-itself-existing content of religion is absolute spirit. This great distinction is to be found within the Christian religion itself, in which the element of Nature does not constitute the content of God, nor does such enter into the sphere of the same as a moment; but God, who is known in spirit and in truth, is the content. And yet this spirit is in reality, in the Catholic religion, set rigidly over against the self-conscious spirit. In the first place, God is presented in the host as an external thing for religious worship, whereas in the Lutheran Church the host as such is first consecrated and elevated to the present God, and only by inner appropriation—*i. e.*, in the annulling of its externality and in faith—*i. e.*, in the spirit at the same time free and self-knowing. Out of that first and highest relation of externality flow all the other external, and therefore unfree, unspiritual, and superstitious relations, particularly a laity which receives the knowledge of divine truth, as well as the direction of the will and the conscience, from without—*i. e.*, from another order which does not itself come to the possession of that knowledge purely in a spiritual way, but requires for it essentially an external consecration. Further, the praying that is mere moving of the lips: that is unspiritual, because the subject renounces direct access to God and prays others to pray; the direction of devotion to wonder-working images, indeed, to bones, and the expectation of miracles from them; in general, the justification through outward works, merit that is to be earned through actions that may indeed be transferred to others, etc.—all this binds the spiritual under an outwardness-to-itself, through which its notion is misapprehended and perverted in the innermost, and right and justice, morality and conscience, the sense of responsibility and duty, are corrupted at the roots.

To such a principle and to this development of the unfreedom of spirit in the religious, only a legislation and constitution of legal and ethical unfreedom and a condition of injustice and immorality in the real state correspond. The Catholic religion has more logically been and is still often, praised so loudly as that by which the permanence of government is insured; in fact, of such governments as are joined with institutions which base themselves on the servitude of the spirit, that should be lawfully and morally free—*i. e.*, on institutions of injustice and a condition

of moral corruption and barbarism. These governments do not know, however, that their fearful power lies in a fanaticism which does not step forth hostilely against them only so long as, and under the condition that, it remains enslaved under the bondage of injustice and immorality. But yet another power is present in spirit; in opposition to that existence out-of-itself, and its broken condition, consciousness collects itself into its inner free reality; it awakens the World-Wisdom in the spirit of governments and peoples—*i. e.*, wisdom concerning that which in reality, in and for itself, is right and reasonable. The production of thought, and, more definitely, philosophy, has been justly called World-Wisdom [or secular wisdom]; for thought gives actuality to the truth of spirit and introduces it into the world, and thus frees it in its reality and to itself.

The content takes with this an entirely different shape. The consequence for the moral content of the want of freedom of the form—*i. e.*, of knowledge and subjectivity—is that self-consciousness is represented to it as not immanent, that it is represented as removed from self-consciousness; so that it is to have true existence only as a negative to the reality of self-consciousness. In this untruth the moral content is called holy. But the self-introduction of the divine spirit into reality through the emancipation of reality into it, that which is said to be holiness in the world, is supplanted by morality. Instead of the vow of chastity, marriage now first passes for the moral, and, consequently, the family, as the highest institution in this human aspect. Instead of the vow of poverty (to which, involving itself in contradiction, corresponds the merit of giving away possessions to the poor, that is to say, enriching them), the activity of personal earning through intelligence and industry asserts itself with probity in this exchange and use of property—morality in civil society. Instead of the vow of blind obedience stands obedience to the law and lawful regulations, which obedience is itself true freedom, because the state is properly self-realizing reason—morality in the state. In this way only can justice and morality come to exist. It is not enough that religion first commands, “Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s,” for it remains necessary to determine what Cæsar is, *i. e.*, what belongs to the temporal government; and it is well enough

known how the temporal government has arbitrarily arrogated everything to itself, as the spiritual government has also done on its side. The divine Spirit must immanently permeate the secular; thus is wisdom concretely in the secular, and its title to itself determined. That concrete indwelling is, however, constituted by the forms of morality referred to—the morality of marriage as opposed to the sanctity of the unmarried state, the morality of the activity of property and gain as opposed to the holiness of poverty and indolence, the morality of obedience to the law of the State as opposed to the sanctity of obedience devoid of right and duty, the bondage of conscience. With the need of law and morality, and the insight into the free nature of spirit, appears the struggle between these and the religion of unfreedom. It is of no avail that the laws and the ordinances of the state have been brought up to the standard of rational organization, if the principle of unfreedom in religion is not given up. The two are incompatible with each other; it is a foolish notion to wish to assign separate provinces to the State and religion, with the opinion that their difference will exercise a peaceful influence on them and prevent contradiction and strife. Principles of lawful freedom can only be abstract and superficial, and the state institutions derived from them must of themselves be untenable if the wisdom which gave birth to those principles understands religion so poorly as not to know that the principles of the reason of reality have their final and highest guarantee in the religious conscience in the subsumption under consciousness of the absolute truth. If, no matter how it happens—*a priori*, so to speak—a legislation which had the principles of reason for its foundation came into contradiction with the popular religion based on principles of spiritual servitude, the test and actualization of the legislation lies with the individuals of the government as such, and the entire administration branching out through all classes, and it were only an abstract empty notion that it were possible that the individuals would act only according to the sense or the letter of the laws, and not according to the spirit of their religion, in which their innermost conscience and highest obligation lie. The laws appear, in this opposition to that which is declared holy by religion, as something made by man; they could maintain, even if they were sanctioned and practically introduced, no lasting op-

position to the contradiction and the assault of the religious spirit. Such laws, even if their content is true, are wrecked upon the conscience whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and does not sanction them. It is a folly of modern times to alter a system of corrupt morality, the constitution, and legislation, without a change in religion ; to effect a revolution without a reformation ; to suppose that a constitution opposed to the old religion and its sanctities can have rest and harmony, and that stability can be given to the laws through external guarantees, for instance, so-called Chambers, and the power given them to determine the finances, etc. We can only regard as a last resource the endeavor to separate justice and the laws from religion, in case there exists an incapacity to descend into the depths of the religious spirit and elevate it to its truth. Those guarantees are rotten supports against the consciences of the subjects who are to administer the laws (and to these belong the guarantees themselves). This it is, much rather, which is the highest, unholiest contradiction, the attempt to bind and subject the religious conscience to the worldly legislation which it counts unholy.

Plato had a more definite understanding of the break which had come about in his time between the existing religion and the constitution on the one hand, and, on the other, the deep demand which freedom, now becoming consciousness of its inward being, made on religion and the political condition. Plato grasps the thought that the true constitution and life of the state are grounded more deeply on the idea, or on the in-and-for-itself universal and true principles of eternal justice. To know and recognize these is certainly the vocation and business of Philosophy. This is the point of view which Plato occupies in the place where he lets Socrates very emphatically declare that philosophy and political power must be united, the Idea must rule if the misfortunes of the nations are to have an end. Plato had in this the definite conception that the Idea, which in itself is in truth the free self-determining thought, can also come to consciousness only in the form of thought ; as a content which, in order to be true, must be raised to universality, and in the most abstract form of universality be brought to consciousness.

In order to compare the Platonic stand-point more precisely with the point of view in which the State is here considered in reference

to religion, it is necessary to be reminded of the distinctions in the notion [these are universal, particular, and singular] which have been essentially indicated in the foregoing. The first distinction is that, in natural things, the substance of the same, the genus or species, is different from its existence in which the substance or species exists as subject. This subjective existence of the genus, however, is further distinguished from that which the species or the universal in general obtains in the image-making thinking, which makes of the universal an abstraction. This deeper individuality, the ground of the free existence of the universal substance, is the self of the thinking spirit [this individuality arises from the self-determining universal, which produces within itself its own particularity]. Natural things do not receive the form of universality and essentiality through themselves; and their individuality is not itself form, which is alone the subjective thought for itself, which in philosophy gives to that universality existence for itself. The human being, on the contrary, is the free spirit itself, and comes to existence in its self-consciousness. This absoluteness, which is the concrete Spirit in itself, is precisely that which has the form, the thinking activity itself, for its content. To the height of thinking consciousness of this principle, Aristotle raised himself in his conception of the entelechy of thought, which is *νοήσις τῆς νοήσεως*, above the Platonic Idea (the species, the substantial). Thought in general, however, contains, and this indeed for the sake of the specified determination itself, also the immediate being-for-self of subjectivity as universality. And the true idea of spirit in itself concrete exists just as essentially in the one of its determinations—the subjective consciousness—as in the other—universality—and is the same substantial content in the one as in the other. To the first form, however, belong feeling, contemplation, representation, and it is much more necessary that consciousness of the absolute idea be grasped first in order of time in this form, and be present in its immediate reality earlier as religion than as philosophy. Philosophy develops itself only from this basis, as the Greek philosophy is later than the Greek religion, and it has attained its perfection only in seizing and comprehending in its complete definite essence the principle of Spirit which first manifested itself in the religion. But the Greek philosophy could only take a position opposed to the religion, the

unity of thought; and the substantiality of the idea could only sustain a hostile relation to the polytheism of fantasy, the glad and frivolous sportiveness of that poetry.

The form in its finite truth, the subjectivity of Spirit, now first broke forth as subjective free thought, which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself, so that this was not yet conceived as Absolute Spirit. Religion could thus first become purified only through the abstract for-itself-existing thought, through philosophy; but the form immanent to the substantial, which philosophy fought and overcame, was that poetic fantasy. The State, which in like manner, but earlier than philosophy, develops itself out of religion, represents in reality as corruption the one-sidedness which its in-itself true Idea has in it. Plato, in common with all his thoughtful contemporaries, recognizing this corruption of democracy and the real defectiveness of its principle, emphasized the substantial, but was unable to impart to his idea of the State the infinite form of subjectivity which was still hidden from his spirit. His State is to himself, on this account, without subjective freedom. The truth which should dwell in the State, regulate and rule it, he conceived, therefore, only in the form of truth, in conscious thought—philosophy—and so pronounced that judgment. So long as philosophers do not rule in States—or those who are now called kings and rulers do not profoundly and comprehensively philosophize—so long will there be no emancipation of the State or of the human race from the evils which exist; so long can the idea of this constitution not arrive at possibility, not see the light of the sun. It was not possible for Plato to proceed to say that so long as the true religion does not appear in the world, and does not rule in States, the true principle of the State has not come into reality. So long, however, it was impossible for this principle to come into thought, the true idea of the State to be conceived from this—the idea of substantial morality with which the freedom of the for-itself-existing self-consciousness is identical. Only in the principle of spirit, knowing its essence in itself absolutely free, and having its reality in the activity of its liberation, exist the absolute possibility and necessity that the power of the state, religion, and the principles of philosophy fall together in one; that the reconciliation of reality in general with spirit, the State with the religious conscience, likewise with philo-

sophical knowledge, be accomplished. Since the for-itself-existing subjectivity is absolutely identical with the substantial universality, religion as such, and also the State as such—as forms in which the principle exists—contains the absolute truth, so that this, since it exists as philosophy, exists only in one of its forms. But since religion in its own development develops also the distinctions contained in the idea, so being can appear in its first immediate—*i. e.*, one-sided—form, and the existence of religion become corrupted to sensual externality, and, consequently, further, to the oppression of the freedom of the spirit and the perversion of political life. But the principle contains the infinite elasticity of the absolute form to overcome this corruption of its determination of form, and, by this means, of the content, and to effect the reconciliation of spirit in itself. Thus, at last, the principle of the religious and the moral conscience becomes one and the same in the Protestant conscience, the free spirit knowing itself in its reasonableness and truth. The constitution and legislation, like their working and trial, have for their content the principle and the development of morality, which proceeds, and only can proceed, from the truth of religion restored to its original principle, and thus first, as such, real. The morality of the state and the religious spirituality of the state are thus the state's reciprocal and sure guarantees.

THE METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MATERIALISM.

BY JOHN DEWEY.

Discussions regarding materialism have been, for the most part, confined to the physiological and psychological aspects of it. Its supporters and opponents have been content to adduce arguments pro or con, as the facts of physical and mental life bear upon the case in hand. It is the object of the present paper to discuss its metaphysical phases.

Hume suggested that possibly one might escape from the nihilistic consequences of his philosophy by means of "the sceptical